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1A machine cannot operate satisfactorily without lubricants… Metaphorically, finance is
the lubricant of the process of economic growth, and the banking system is the chief
dispenser of finance. (Cameron et al 1967: 2)
I. Introduction
The role of financial markets in economic development continues to attract
increasing attention both in academia and among policy-makers.1  Evidence from recent
empirical studies suggests that deeper, broader, and better functioning financial markets
can stimulate higher economic growth (Levine, Loayza and Beck 2000; Beck, Levine,
and Loayza 1999; King and Levine 1993a, 1993b).  Although evidence on Africa is still
limited, the results from existing empirical work supports the view that financial
development has a positive effect on economic growth in African countries (Ndikumana
2000; Allen and Ndikumana 2000; Gelbard and Leite 1999; Odedokun 1996; Spears
1992).  The discussion of strategies for enhancing African economic development must
therefore take into account the role of the financial sector in economic development.
This chapter reviews the theory and evidence on the links between financial
development and economic activity in the context of African countries.  The text is
organized as follows.  The next section gives a brief summary of the various functions of
the financial system and the mechanisms of transmission through which financial
intermediation can enhance economic activity.  Section III presents stylized facts on the
trends and patterns of financial development in Africa since the 1970s, discusses the size
and performance of African stock markets, and summarizes the findings from existing
empirical studies on the effects of financial development on economic growth in African
                                                
1 Levine (1997) offers a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the finance-
growth nexus.
2economies.  Section IV briefly discusses selected issues related to financial market
development and economic development policy, namely the role of the government in the
banking industry; the role of the central bank, central bank independence and regulatory
efficiency; the structure of the financial system, i.e., stock market-based vs. bank-based;
the capital flight problem and its effects on financial intermediation.  Section V
concludes.
II. The Financial system and real economic activity: Overview
A. Functions of the financial system
The financial system interacts with real economic activity through its various
functions by which it facilitates economic exchange.2  The financial system plays an
important role in mobilizing funds and transforming them into assets that can better meet
the needs of investors.  By facilitating portfolio diversification, financial intermediaries
allow savers to maximize returns to their assets and to reduce risk. Financial
intermediaries transfer resources across time and space, thus allowing investors and
consumers to borrow against future income and meet current needs.  This enables deficit
units (those whose current expenditures exceed current income) to overcome financing
constraints and the difficulties arising from mismatches between income and expenditure
flows.  Financial institutions play an important role in easing the tension between savers’
preference for liquidity and entrepreneurs’ need for long-term finance.  Therefore, at any
given level of saving, an efficient financial system will allow for a higher level of
investment by maximizing the proportion of saving that actually finances investment
(Pagano 1993).  With an efficient financial system, resources will also be utilized more
                                                
2 See, among others, Merton (1995) for details on the functions of the financial system.
3efficiently due to the ability of financial intermediaries to identify the most productive
investment opportunities.
Financial systems play an important role in creating a pricing information
mechanism.  By providing a mechanism for appraisal of the value of firms, financial
systems allow investors to make informed decisions about the allocation of their funds.
Financial intermediaries can also mitigate information asymmetries that characterize
market exchange.  One party to a transaction often has valuable information that the other
party does not have.  In such circumstances, there may be unexploited exchange
opportunities.  In the case of a firm, information imperfections can result in sub-optimal
investment.  When a manager cannot fully and credibly reveal information about a
worthy investment project to outside investors and lenders, the firm may not be able to
raise the outside funds necessary to undertake such a project (see Myers and Majluf
1984).  In a market plagued by information imperfections, the equilibrium quantity and
quality of investment will fall short of the economy’s potential.  Financial intermediaries
can mitigate such problems by collecting information about prospective borrowers.3
The financial system can enhance efficiency in the corporate sector by monitoring
management and exerting corporate control (Stiglitz 1985).  Savers cannot effectively
verify the quality of investment projects or the efficiency of the management.  Financial
intermediaries can monitor the behavior of corporate managers and foster efficient use of
borrowed funds better than savers acting individually.  Financial intermediaries thus
fulfill the function of “delegated monitoring” by representing the interests of savers
                                                
3 Note however that financial intermediaries do not fully alleviate information imperfections.  Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) point out that it is indeed impossible for financial markets to be informationally
efficient.  The problems of imperfect information are likely to be more pronounced in developing countries
4(Diamond 1984).  Financial markets also can improve managerial efficiency by
promoting competition through effective takeover or threat of takeover (Jensen and
Meckling 1976).4
B. Finance and economic growth: historical and econometric evidence
The links between financial development and economic growth is not a new
theme in the economics literature.  Ninety years ago, Schumpeter (1934)5 observed that
financial markets play an important role in the growth process by channeling funds to the
most efficient investors and by fostering entrepreneurial innovation.  Schumpeter’s view
was that financial development leads economic growth.  Robinson (1952), however,
argued that financial development passively follows economic growth by responding to
the increasing demand for funds due to economic prosperity.  While the debate on
causality is still unsettled, existing historical and econometric evidence suggests that
better functioning financial markets, i.e., markets that are able to meet the needs of savers
and investors efficiently, have a positive effect on future economic growth (Levine 1997).
The economic history literature has documented cross-country and country-
specific evidence that illustrates the importance of financial systems in early industrial
development.  Using data from 1790 to 1850, Rouseau and Silla (1999) find quantitative
evidence that supports the hypothesis that early industrial growth in the United States was
finance-led.  These authors conclude that by providing debt and equity finance to the
                                                                                                                                                
compared to advanced countries.  Therefore, the ability of financial markets to allocate resources efficiently
is reduced in the context of developing countries (Singh 1999; 1997).
4 However, some researchers have disputed the alleged value-enhancing role of takeovers.  First,
information imperfections may imply a premium on the price to be paid by outside buyers (Myers and
Majluf 1984).  Second, the free-rider problem may deter investment in the search for information about
profitable takeovers (Stiglitz 1985).  Third, takeovers may result in transfers of wealth that reduce the
overall social welfare (Shleifer and Summers 1988).
5 The 1934 edition of Schumpter’s pioneering book is the third edition of Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung [The Theory of Economic Development], which was published for the first time in 1911.
5corporate and government sectors, the financial system was critical to the modernization
process, which it predated.  Using data on the United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
Norway and Sweden, Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) conclude that financial
intermediation was an important factor in the industrial transformation of these countries.
Other studies include Corosso (1970) who documented the role of early US investment
banking in mobilizing savings to raise capital; Cameron, Crisp, Patrick, and Tilly (1967)
who examined European countries, Russia and Japan; and Haber (1991) who compared
the cases of Brazil, Mexico and the United States.6  These studies provide evidence that
supports the proposition that better functioning financial systems play an important role
in economic growth.
Following the work by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) several studies have
provided econometric evidence that supports the view that financial development is a
potent predictor of future economic growth. 7  The results in these studies have made
significant progress in establishing that to some extent, the causal relationship runs from
financial development to economic growth.
The findings from studies based on aggregate data have been supported by studies
that use disaggregated data on the industry and firm level.  Using a large sample of
industries from many countries, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find evidence indicating that
financial development mitigates financing constraints for industries that rely most heavily
on external finance.  These authors find that such industries grow faster in countries with
more developed financial systems.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) and Beck
                                                
6 See Levine (1997) for more references on this topic.
7 The findings from early cross-sectional analysis have been strengthened by more recent studies that use
panel data econometric techniques (Levine 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000; Beck, Levine, and
Loayza 1999).
6and Levine (2000) provide further international firm-level evidence on the positive
effects of access to a well-functioning financial system on firm growth.  These studies
have generalized the results from the literature on the effects of financing constraints on
investment initiated by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) who used data from the
manufacturing sector of the United States.  Several studies have shown that the results on
the links between financing constraints and investment by manufacturing firms hold also
for developing countries.8
It is important to reiterate that while this large amount of historical and
econometric evidence suggests that financial development facilitates economic growth,
this does not rule out the possibility of a causal relationship in the reverse direction.  It is
perfectly possible that financial systems develop in response to higher economic growth
or in anticipation of future prosperity.  These two causal processes are not mutually
exclusive and may very well be a natural feature of the links between finance and
economic growth.  It is in this context that we should interpret the evidence discussed in
this chapter.
III. Financial development and economic growth in Africa: An assessment
A. A note on the data
Measuring financial development constitutes an important challenge to
researchers in their efforts to assess the impact of financial intermediation on real
economic activity. 9  In measuring financial development, it would be ideal to obtain
detailed information that enables us to assess how the financial system fulfills its roles of
                                                
8 See the study by Begsten et al. (1999) on manufacturing firms in Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, and
Zimbabwe; Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (1996) on Ecuadorian firms; Athey and Laumas (1994) on
Indian firms; and Tybout (1983) on Colombian firms.
7facilitating exchange, mobilizing saving, managing risk, identifying productive
investment projects, and monitoring management.  Such detailed information is still
sparse especially in the case of developing countries.
The indicators of financial development used in empirical studies can be
classified roughly in three broad categories: monetary aggregates, stock market
indicators, and structural and institutional indicators.
· Monetary aggregates, also referred to as “traditional measures,” are the most widely
used indicators because they are the most widely published in national and
international data sets.  The main sources of these data are the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. The
indicators used include:
- Conventional measures of money supply such as narrow money (M1), broad money
(M2), and quasi-money (M3) scaled by the country’s GDP.
- Measures of the supply of credit by banks as a share of total domestic credit or as a
ratio of GDP.
- Measures of the supply of credit to the private sector as a share of total domestic
credit or as a ratio of GDP.
· Stock market measures include indicators of the size of the market and indicators of
liquidity (see Levine and Zervos 1998).  The size of the stock market is measured by
the number of listed companies and the capitalization of listed companies (total
volume or as ratio of GDP).  Stock market liquidity is measured by the value of
shares traded (volume or ratio of GDP) and the turnover ratio.
                                                                                                                                                
9 See Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000); Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999); and Lynch (1996) for a
discussion of problems related to the measurement of financial development.
8· Structural and institutional indicators provide information that enables us to directly
or indirectly assess the efficiency and sophistication of the financial systems.  These
indicators include:
- Indicators of financial structure that distinguish between bank-based and stock
market-based financial systems (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1999; and Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 1999).
- Indicators of banking regulation, banking ownership structure, and banking
concentration, which provide information on the degree of concentration in the
banking sector, the share of state-owned vs. privately owned banks, and the level of
regulatory restrictions in the business of banking (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2000;
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1999).10
- Indicators of financial liberalization, which include the degree of control of the
interest rate and the degree of intervention of the state in credit allocation.
In the case of African countries, recent surveys, especially those by Mehran et al
(1998) and Gelbard and Leite (1999) have made a significant contribution to this area.
Based on results from a survey of 38 sub-Saharan African countries in 1997, Gelbard and
Leite compiled indicators on six major aspects of financial development:  (1) the market
structure and competitiveness of the financial system, (2) the range of financial products
available on the market, (3) the degree of financial liberalization, (4) the institutional
environment under which the financial system operates, (5) the degree of integration with
foreign financial markets (financial openness), and (6) the degree of sophistication of
monetary policy instruments.  Gelbard and Leite computed indices that summarize the
9level of development of a country for each of the six aspects as well as a composite index
that measures the overall level financial development in 1987 and 1997.11  Countries
were then classified as undeveloped, minimally developed, somewhat developed, or
largely developed.  The indicators compiled in by Gelbard and Leite are highly
informative not only on cross-country variations in the overall level of financial
development, but also on differences in certain features of the institutional environment
that are relevant for financial development.  The findings from these surveys are
summarized in Section D below.
B. Financial development: trends and patterns
In this section we present some stylized fats on economic performance and overall
financial development using aggregate statistics based primarily on the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators.  As can be seen from Table 1, average real income,
investment, and saving have declined in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.12  In the sub-
Saharan African sample, average real income, investment, and saving have declined
systematically in every decade since the 1970s.  Table A1 in the appendix presents
average real income, investment, and saving by decade for 42 African countries.
According to these statistics, only twelve of the 42 countries experienced an increase in
real income from the 1970s to the 1990s.  For as many as 16 countries in the sample, per-
capita real income in the 1990s was lower than in the 1970s.  These statistics illustrate
what some researchers have referred to as “growth tragedy” or “development disasters”
                                                                                                                                                
10 Measuring the degree of regulatory restrictiveness involves an assessment of the extent to which banks
are allowed to engage in transactions other than the traditional operations of lending and saving
mobilization (like ownership or direct involvement in the management of nonfinancial firms).
11 Gelbard and Leite’s survey covered only 1997.  The information for 1987 was compiled retroactively by
the authors from various sources.  This information was then reviewed by IMF country economists, who
obtained input from country authorities and IMF resident representatives.
10
(Easterly and Levine 1998; Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 1997).  While the continent
includes success stories like Botswana, Mauritius, and Seychelles, whose income levels
are high and rising, it also includes a number of disappointing cases.  Even countries with
vast resources like the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaïre) and Nigeria have
been unable to meet expectations due to many factors, including poor macroeconomic
management and political corruption.
Since the 1980s, aggregate indicators of financial development have either
stagnated or declined on average in sub-Saharan Africa (Table 2 and Figure 1).  For sub-
Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, the average size of the financial system (as
measured by total liquid liabilities of financial intermediaries) and credit supply were
lower in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.  If South Africa or North African countries
(Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) are included, the statistics show an increase in the volume
of credit supply from the 1970s to the 1990s.  The data also highlight the predominant
size of the South African financial system.  The average bank credit to GDP ratio for the
sub-Saharan African sample in 1990-98 is 81% when South Africa is included, but only
26% when it is excluded.  It is primarily through the supply of credit that financial
intermediation stimulates real economic activity.  Therefore the decline in credit supply
in sub-Saharan Africa may be a factor for the poor economic performance of the sub-
continent over the past two decades.
The aggregate indicators of financial development hide wide disparities across
countries.  As can be seen in Table A2, there is a large gap between countries with
sizeable financial systems, with liquid liabilities of over 40% of GDP, and countries with
                                                                                                                                                
12 Collier and Gunning (1999a, 1999b) offer surveys of the recent literature on economic performance in
Africa.
11
much smaller financial systems.  The countries with relatively large financial systems
include North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia) and some sub-
Saharan African countries such as Kenya and South Africa.  These countries also have
high ratios of credit supply to GDP, and most of them have experienced an increase in
credit supply while credit supply declined in the majority of other sub-Saharan African
countries over the 1970-1998 period.
The diversity in financial development across the African continent is illustrated
also in a high concentration of the largest banks in just a few countries.  Although
detailed information is sparse on this topic, the existing evidence shows that North
African countries and South Africa have larger banks than other countries.  Table 3
contains information on the 150 largest banks in Africa in 1996.  The banks from three
countries, Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa account for about 75% of the assets held by
the 150 largest banks.  Adding Tunisian banks raises the share to over 80%.  Banks in
these countries also account for the bulk of deposits and loans in this sub-sample of the
African banking sector.  There is a high disparity in the ratio of loans to deposits, varying
from 37% in Côte d’Ivoire to 153% in South Africa.  In some countries banks seem to
have large idle capacity in credit supply.  It would be worth investigating what causes the
large variations in the loans/deposits ratios across countries and why banks in some
countries choose to hoard cash rather than issuing loans.
C. Stock market development
African stock markets are characterized by high diversity in terms of age, size,
and performance.  The continent counts both long-established stock markets (Egypt,
South Africa, Zimbabwe) dating from the 1880s as well as more recent ones (Table 4).
12
With a market capitalization of 170 billion dollars in 1998 (128% of GDP), the South
African stock market is a giant compared to tiny markets like Swaziland (85 million
dollars, or 7% of GDP).  Over all, the majority of African markets are still in their
infancy, with a limited number of listed companies, low capitalization, and little diversity
among market participants.  This is the case even for markets that were established a long
time ago.  For example, the Egyptian stock market was largely dormant for over forty
years following the policy shifts of the 1950s marked by the nationalization of industry
and the adoption of central planning policy (Mecagni and Sourial 1999).  The market
developed substantially in the 1990s, with an increase in the number of listed companies,
market capitalization and liquidity.
The African continent has experienced a relatively fast development of equity
markets over the past two decades.  In 1980, Africa counted only 8 active stock markets,
but by 1999, the number had more than doubled, up to 17 (Table 4).13  Market
capitalization also expanded significantly.  The newer markets have grown fast in
general, whereas the situation is more mixed among the more mature ones.  Relative to
GDP, stock market capitalization in Zimbabwe declined by 3.4% from 1990 to 1998; it
increased by 0.5% in South Africa, 4.8% in Nigeria, 16% in Kenya, and by 28% in Egypt
over the same period.  However, the observed stock market expansion has not been
accompanied by any systematic improvement in economic performance (Table 5).  Real
income, domestic investment, and saving have declined or stagnated in the 1990s in the
majority of countries with active stock markets, mirroring the overall poor economic
performance in the continent as discussed earlier.
                                                
13 Table 4 does not include the recently established stock markets in Malawi (1997), Tanzania (1996), and
Uganda (1997).
13
African stock markets are highly illiquid, with very low trading and turnover
ratios.  Low liquidity of stock markets has important implications for real economic
activity.  High stock market liquidity reduces risk through risk sharing, which encourages
saving and investment.  It is stock market liquidity, more than the size of the market, that
plays an important role in facilitating long-term (illiquid) investment (Levine and Zervos
1998).  Therefore, low liquidity implies limited opportunities for the transformation of
illiquid assets into liquid assets, which can constrain economic activity.
African stock markets are highly volatile, both in their growth rates and their rates
of return.  For example, after an increase by 261% from 1996 to 1997, market
capitalization in Zambia declined by 58% from 1997 to 1998.  The rate of return in this
market dropped from 103% in 1997 to -58% in 1998.  High stock market volatility has
important adverse effects on the financial system as a whole and real economic activity
(see Singh 1997; Pagano 1993).  The weak economic base, high country-specific risk,
and a weak external position constitute important obstacles to growth and stability of
African stock markets.
Despite the various structural problems faced by African stock markets, some of
them are highly profitable and often rank among the most lucrative markets in the world
(Clark 1998: 1).  This illustrates the generally high returns to foreign capital in African
economies.  The rates of return to foreign investment in Africa are often higher than those
in other developing regions.  For example, in 1997, the average rate of return to US
foreign direct investment (FDI) was 25% in Africa compared to 16% in Asia, 12% in
Latin America, and 14% in all developing countries (UNCTAD 1998).  Two important
14
stylized facts about FDI in Africa are worth emphasizing.14  First, the aggregate volume
of FDI in Africa has increased substantially over the 1990s.  Annual FDI inflows to
Africa, excluding South Africa, increased from an average of $1.2 billion in the 1981-
1985 period to $2.9 billion in 1986-1991, and $5.3 billion in the 1992-1998 period.15
The second noteworthy stylized fact is the increasing diversification in the
destination of FDI in Africa.  While FDI has traditionally targeted resource-rich
countries, especially oil exporters, other countries are attracting increasing attention from
international investors.  The share of oil exporters in total FDI in Africa declined from
70% in the 1980s to about 59% in the 1990s (Ndikumana 2001).  Mozambique, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, in particular, have experienced a substantial increase in
FDI (Table 6 and Figure 2).  The evidence suggests that FDI is responsive to
improvement in the macroeconomic environment through economic and institutional
reform.  For example, Uganda, which has made significant progress in economic reform,
has attracted more FDI than neighboring Kenya.  Although Kenya has a more developed
financial system than Uganda, it also has a more unstable macroeconomic and political
environment, which tends to discourage foreign capital.
D. Structural and institutional indicators of financial development
From the surveys by Mehran et al (1998) and Gelbard and Leite (1999), we can
draw the following stylized facts about the development of financial markets in African
countries over the past two decades.
                                                
14 For further details on private capital flows to Africa, see Ndikumana (2001); Bhinda, Griffith-Jones,
Leape, and Martin (1999); and Kasekende, Kitabire, and Martin (1999).
15 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (1998, 2000); UNCTAD (1995), Foreign Direct Investment in
Africa.
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· Overall development: The structural and institutional indicators illustrate the cross-
country diversity in financial development pointed out earlier using aggregate
measures.  The structural and institutional indicators paint a much better picture (than
aggregate indicators) for the overall financial development in the continent.  Based on
Gelbard and Leite’s overall financial development index, the number of countries in
their sample that were classified as somewhat or largely developed financially grew
from two (Mauritius and South Africa) in 1987 to 27 in 1997 (see Table A2).16
According to Gelbard and Leite, the countries with the most developed financial
system in 1997 were Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia.
However, measures of credit supply have deteriorated in some countries that are
classified as largely developed or somewhat developed.  This is the case for Zambia
(largely developed), Nigeria, Malawi, and others (see Figure 1).  It is important to
notice that the rankings in Gelbard and Leite (1999) are relative to other African
countries; so they should not be interpreted as indicators of financial development
from a worldwide perspective.  Only Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa, which are
classified among “emerging markets,” can be considered as relatively developed from
an international standard.
· Market structure: Ownership in the banking industry has evolved significantly from a
predominantly state-controlled to a more privately owned system.  In 1997, 13 out of
the 38 countries in Gelbard and Leite’s sample had almost complete private
ownership of banks.  Banks were predominantly state-owned in 10 countries in the
sample, where the state accounted for at least 30 percent of bank loans and deposits.
The banking system is still highly concentrated in the majority of sub-Saharan
                                                
16 The sample in Table A2 does not match the sample in Gelbard-Leite’s survey.
16
African countries as indicated by the conventional Herfindahl index and the interest
rate spread in the Gelbard-Leite (1999) study.
· The performance of the banking system has improved in some countries, but it is still
low in the majority of countries.  High proportions of non-performing loans illustrate
the inefficiencies in the credit allocation process and in loan repayment enforcement
mechanisms.  The average share of non-performing loans for the 38 countries in
Gelbard-Leite’s sample was over 20 percent in 1997.  Low loan repayment rates (high
default rates) constitute an important handicap for the stability of the banking system
and it has adverse effects on the real sector.  In particular, high default rates
discourage lending, thereby reducing the overall supply of credit, which depresses
private investment.
· With the exception of South Africa, African financial systems offer a limited range of
financial products.  Gelbard and Leite (1999) find that bank lending is predominantly
short term, government securities tend have short maturities (less than a year in 23
countries in 1997), banks in many countries still don’t issue credit cards (issued in
only 15 countries in 1997), and inter-bank lending is still underdeveloped (inexistent
in 8 countries in the sample in 1997).
· The institutional environment is still deficient in many countries.  Table 7 presents
some indicators of the institutional environment from the Mehran et al (1998) study,
namely the supervisory framework (banking law and central bank autonomy),
prudential regulation (bank capital ratios), the safety net (availability of deposit
insurance), and the legal infrastructure.  The table shows that some of the basic
requirements for effective banking regulation and supervision are still inexistent in
17
many countries.  For example, many countries have no provisions for deposit
insurance and the legal infrastructure for the protection of bank performance is weak
or inexistent in many countries.
The Gelbard-Leite (1999) study paints a brighter picture.  According to the
Gelbard-Leite indexes, in 1997 the institutional environment could be considered as
reasonably supportive for financial intermediation in 23 countries, up from just 8
countries in 1987.  The institutional environment index includes indicators of specific
features of the legal system and the regulatory framework that facilitate financial
intermediation.  These features include the existence of property and creditors’ rights and
the ability of the judicial system to enforce such rights.  Empirical studies have
established a positive connection between financial development and the quality of the
legal environment (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998, 1997; Levine
1998).  The two aspects of the legal system that are most critical for financial
intermediation are the quality of laws and the effectiveness of enforcement of these laws.
These two aspects must exist simultaneously.  The quality of a legal system determines
the rights of creditors pertaining especially to the respect for the security of loans and the
ability to repossess the assets of defaulting borrowers.  To encourage lending, these legal
rights must be both clearly defined and effectively enforced.  Enforcement of the rights of
creditors requires a judiciary that maintains the rule of law, low corruption, and low risk
of expropriation or contract repudiation.
While visible progress was achieved over the past years, there are important
institutional constraints to financial intermediation that African countries need to address.
For example, the Gelbard-Leite survey reports that in 1997 the loan recovery process was
18
difficult in as many as 28 sub-Saharan countries, commercial legislation was inadequate
in 14 countries, and there was no legislation of the use of checks in as many as 11
countries in the sample.
E. Linking financial development and economic growth in Africa: existing evidence
Examining the linkages between financial development and economic growth
requires addressing two separate but related empirical questions.  The first is whether the
overall development of the financial system leads to higher economic growth.  The
second question is to identify the channels through which financial intermediation affects
economic growth.
The empirical economic growth literature has addressed the first question by
relating indicators of financial development to the growth rate of real per capita income
in growth models including conventional determinants of economic growth (especially
investment, human capital, and initial income).  While there are only a handful of studies
that focus explicitly on Africa, the existing evidence suggests that financial development
has a positive effect on economic growth.  Odedokun (1996) and Spears (1992) find that
aggregate measures of financial intermediation have positive and statistically significant
effects on the growth rate of real per capita GDP.  Allen and Ndikumana (2000) find
similar results in the case of the Southern African Development Community.  Gelbard
and Leite (1999) also find results that suggest a positive and statistically significant link
between real per capita GDP growth and their indices of financial development.  They
find that both the level of initial financial development and the change in the overall
financial development index between 1987 and 1997 are positively and significantly
19
related to economic growth. 17  Their results confirm the findings from earlier studies that
concluded that the initial level of financial development is an important determinant of
future economic growth (King and Levine 1993a).  Gelbard and Leite (1999) also find
that the changes in the indexes of financial liberalization, the institutional environment,
and the array of financial products enter the growth equation positively and significantly.
To address the second empirical question, researchers seek to examine how
financial development affects the factors that are believed to cause economic growth.
These include capital accumulation, factor productivity growth, and saving.  Cross-
country studies have made significant advances on this front,18 but evidence on African
countries remains limited.  However the existing evidence suggests that research in this
area is promising.  Ndikumana (2000) finds that financial development positively affects
domestic investment.  At this point, we are not aware of empirical studies that have
linked financial development to factor productivity growth or saving in Africa.
IV Selected issues in financial markets and economic development policy
In this section we identify and briefly discuss some important topics related to
financial development and the role of financial markets in economic development.  The
list is by no means exhaustive nor is the discussion in any way comprehensive.
A. Government and banking
In the early post-independence era, African governments sought to use financial
development as a tool of speeding up economic growth.  Governments became the main
players in the creation of new financial intermediaries, including development banks and
commercial banks as well as in the nationalization of commercial banks.  Policymakers
                                                
17 In Gelbard and Leite’s  regressions, the change in the financial development index is statistically
significant only when it is entered simultaneously with the index of initial level of financial development.
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adopted the view that it was possible to foster economic growth by identifying growth-
promoting sectors and providing subsidized credit to promote those sectors.
Governments also controlled interest rates, which, in the context of high and volatile
inflation, often resulted in negative real interest rates.
By the 1980s, the financial sector was experiencing the same problems of
mismanagement and inefficient allocation of resources that plagued the public sector in
the majority of African countries.  The financial system was characterized by pervasive
default on loans, especially by state-owned enterprises, which accounted for a large share
of the domestic credit supply.  This weakened financial intermediaries, forcing
governments to inject more resources in the system in the form of subsidies to keep ailing
institutions afloat.  The disappointing experience of government-sponsored financial
development forced countries to revise their strategies.  Even though the government’s
presence is still significant in many countries, there is a visible trend towards more
private ownership of banks.  As part of the financial sector reform programs initiated in
the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, state-owned financial institutions have been
privatized or restructured to reduce the share of the government in the ownership
structure, and the creation of new private banks has accelerated due to the easing of
licensing requirements.19  One undesirable effect of liberalization in some countries has
been the proliferation of small undercapitalized institutions (World Bank 2000b).
Moreover, the expansion of private sector participation has not resulted in a systematic
                                                                                                                                                
18 See Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (1999).
19 For example, in Nigeria, the number of commercial banks increased from 28 to 66 between 1985 and
1992.  In Ghana, five new private banks were created between 1987 and 1994.  Private sector control of the
banking system is highest in Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (Aryeetey and Senbet 2000).
See Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) for further details on recent financial sector reforms in Africa.
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increase in competition in the banking sector.  Banking systems in many countries are
still characterized by a high degree of concentration.
The government can foster financial development by pursuing sound
macroeconomic management, especially fiscal discipline to improve macroeconomic
stability, which minimizes macroeconomic uncertainty.  African countries have
systematically suffered from bad fiscal policies that have exacerbated the effects of
external shocks, resulting in high chronic fiscal deficits.  At reasonable levels, fiscal
deficits have minimal adverse effects on the financial system.  But when fiscal deficits
are chronically high, this increases the likelihood of monetary financing of the deficits
and also forces the government to compete with private actors in the credit market.  There
is evidence that African countries that have made significant progress in macroeconomic
and financial sector reform also have experienced improvement in economic performance
and that their financial systems are improving.  Uganda is often cited as an example of
recent success in economic reform (see, among others, Kasekende and Hussain 200).
The Ugandan government as well as the Bank of Uganda have progressively established
a good record of credibility in policy decision making, which has promoted an
environment that is conducive to private investment and growth.
The government also can enhance financial development by promoting a strong,
independent, and effective legal system.  The judiciary plays and important role in
enforcing the constitutional protection of individual and property rights, and by
adjudicating commercial disputes.  The benefits of an efficient judiciary include the
predictability of the legal environment and the protection of investors against policy
reversals.  The predictability of commercial law reduces the risk associated with saving
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and other forward-oriented transactions both in the real sector and in the financial system.
As a result, this facilitates the maturity transformation role of financial intermediaries as
well as portfolio management by savers.
Legal systems in many African countries do not adequately fulfill their role of
facilitating and enforcing the rules of economic exchange.  Legal procedures often are
excessively long, which imposes costly delays on economic actors.20  The lack of
autonomy of the judiciary from the executive branch and from political and business
interest groups results in lack of impartiality in the handling of commercial disputes.
There are wide variations across African countries in the quality of law and the
effectiveness of the legal system in facilitating economic exchange.  To date, there are no
studies on Africa that have linked these cross-country variations in the legal system to
differences in financial development.  It would be worthwhile to investigate whether the
results from the existing cross-country studies that suggest that enforcement of investor
rights and financial market development vary depending on a country’s legal origin (as
suggested by La Porta et al. 1997, 1998 and Levine 1998) hold in the case of African
countries.21
B. The role of the central bank: independence and regulatory efficiency
The development of robust financial systems in African countries will necessitate
the ability of central banks to exercise efficiently their functions to promote the stability
of the financial system and the macroeconomy.  To achieve this goal, central banks need
                                                
20 For example, Widner’s (2000) study on Botswana, Tanzania, and Uganda reports that in commercial
cases, the delay in legal procedures often ranges from 3 to 8 years, and even 10 years some times.
21 La Porta et al (1997, 1998) suggest that common-law countries have stronger legal protections for
investors and more developed financial markets than French-civil-law countries.  Using the legal
environment as an instrument for financial development, Levine (1998) in turn finds that financial
development has a positive effect on output growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth.
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to be endowed with an adequate level of autonomy. 22  In principle, central bank
independence serves as a restraint on government policy, especially by shielding
monetary policy from fiscal indiscipline through specific rules governing government
borrowing from the central bank.  This enables the central bank to exercise discretionary
monetary policy rather than simply being a “printing press” for the government.  Central
bank independence also plays an important role in establishing credibility for monetary
policy, which is a key ingredient for the stability of the macroeconomy.  Credibility of
the central bank facilitates decision making by private actors by reducing the uncertainty
of the policy environment.
In most African countries the central bank has not performed well in their
function as a restraint on government policy and they have performed poorly also in their
role as a regulator of the banking sector.  Until recently, most countries lacked the basic
laws that govern the regulatory functions of the central bank, and even when the laws
existed, they were poorly enforced.  This is true for national banks as well as
supranational banks as in the case of the CFA zone, for instance.  We highlight three
main reasons for these weaknesses.23
First, national authorities have regarded the central bank as their primary
financier, and have therefore been reluctant to relinquish their political leverage over
                                                
22 Central bank independence generally means “instrument independence”, which is the ability of the
central bank to choose the tools in order to pursue specific ultimate goals mandated by the legislature.  To
assess the degree of central bank independence, researchers combine information on both the (formal) legal
institutional prescriptions and the actual practice.  Such information include: the rules of appointment and
dismissal of the governor; the legal mandate of the bank to pursue price stability (and how important this
objective is relative to others); the rules and limitations on government borrowing from the central bank;
the length of the term in office and turnover rate of central bank governors.  Seminal works on indicators of
central bank independence and the relationship between these indicators and outcomes of monetary policy
include Grilli, Masciandro, and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman (1992), and Alesina and Summers (1993).
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monetary policy for the purpose of deficit financing.  This illustrates the short-termism
that characterizes political calculations on the part of national leaders.
The second factor is the poor institutional design of central banks starting from
their creation.  For example, while countries have rules on limits for government
borrowing from the central bank, they rarely have statutory provisions for conditionality
and sanctions in the event that those rules are violated.24  Moreover, the leadership of
central banks (national and regional) is generally not independent of the executive branch
of government.  Governors of national central banks in sub-Saharan Africa (with few
exceptions, like South Africa) usually have little or no independence from the
government.  This is also the case for the regional central banks in the CFA zone.  For
instance, the members of the boards of the two regional central banks of the CFA zone
are representatives of Finance Ministries of member countries and include no
representatives from commercial banks.  Recently, many countries have made significant
advances in this area with the establishment or strengthening of banking laws to provide
more independence to the central bank and a stronger prudential regulation base
(Aryeetey and Senbet 2000).
The third factor is the lack of a strong private financial sector lobby (Stasavage
2000).  An active private financial sector lobby is an important factor in fostering central
bank independence especially when the formal institutional foundation is weak or
inexistent.  The private financial sector has an advantage in central bank independence
                                                                                                                                                
23 Other constraints include the lack of qualified central bank staff in the areas of supervision and regulation
and the slow pace of adjustment of the regulatory framework to changes in the scale and scope of financial
market operations (see Aryeetey and Senbet 2000).
24 For example, most CFA member governments systematically exceeded their borrowing ceilings (by as
much as 80% for the government of Côte d’Ivoire).  Also governments were able to circumvent the limits
by indirect borrowing via state-owned enterprises or by pushing commercial and development banks to
supply credit to relieve fiscal pressures (Stasavage 2000).
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because it is a means to achieving greater price stability.  Due to the inherent maturity
mismatches between the assets and the liabilities of financial institutions, inflation
volatility is highly costly for these institutions.
The willingness of politicians to grant central bank independence depends on
whether the perceived problem (or political liability) is price instability or low growth.  If
it is the former, governments are likely to be more inclined to relinquish control over
monetary policy, whereas if it is the latter, politicians may sacrifice monetary policy
autonomy to the short-run benefits of expansionary monetary policy.  In the long run,
however, countries benefit from the macroeconomic stability that arises from monetary
policy autonomy.
Before closing the discussion of central bank independence, two observations are
warranted.  First, while central bank independence has received the most attention, there
are alternative arrangements that can be used to restrain monetary policy. 25  Examples
include the adherence to a fixed exchange rate regime and membership to a monetary
union.  However, just like in the case of central bank independence, these alternative
arrangements are effective only if there are clear rules that prevent countries from
reneging the commitment.  Second, unlike what some scholars claim (for instance, Grilli,
Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991), having an independent central bank (or adhering to
any other institutional arrangement of restraint) is not like having a free lunch.  Central
bank independence involves a trade-off between price stability and the ability of national
authorities to respond to exogenous shocks.  Excessively rigid monetary policy can be
counterproductive, as was seen in the case of CFA zone countries from the 1980s to the
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early 1990s.  Following the collapse of commodity prices in the late 1970s, these
countries suffered the “twin blows” of declining terms of trade and real appreciation of
the CFA due to the appreciation of the French Franc, especially vis-à-vis the dollar (see
Ball 1999).  In the end, while CFA zone countries enjoyed higher price stability than
most other African countries, this came at the cost of a protracted recession that could
have been avoided under a more flexible monetary policy and exchange rate regime.
C. Does financial structure matter? Markets vs. banks
In designing policies aimed at developing their financial systems to stimulate
economic growth, African countries must address two related but distinct questions.
First, what are the best strategies for fostering financial development?  Second, which
financial structure – bank-based or stock market-based, or a combination of the two – is
most appropriate to their national objectives and their specific economic environment?
While the first question has attracted substantial attention both in academia and in policy
circles, the issue of financial structure has received relatively less consideration.
Nonetheless, there are good reasons for why African countries must take this issue
seriously.  Some of these reasons are highlighted below.
First, historical evidence suggests that there is a connection between a country’s
stage of development and the structure of its financial system.  In the early stages of
development, banks play a predominant role in financing investment in infrastructure,
which stimulates the growth process.  As a country reaches higher levels of income, it is
expected that stock markets play an increasing role.  This argument has been supported
both by historical studies on industrial growth (Cameron et al. 1967; Gerschenkron 1962)
                                                                                                                                                
25 The conventional assumption is that central bankers are more conservative (have a stronger tolerance
level for the costs associated with achieving low inflation) than the society as whole (Rogoff 1985).  This
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and by more recent studies using broad data sets on financial structure around the world
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1999).  These studies find that more developed countries
tend to have relatively larger and more liquid stock markets while the financial systems
of less developed countries tend to be predominantly bank-based.
Second there is a close connection between financial structure and the type of
investment finance supplied by the financial system.  Banks tend to specialize in debt
finance, while stock markets provide equity finance.  Both forms of finance are needed
for private sector activity and the economy will prosper better when both forms of
finance are available.
Empirical research shows that bank loans constitute the primary source of outside
funding for the corporate sector.  For instance, U.S. banks provided about 62 percent of
total outside finance for nonfinancial firms on average for the 1970-1998 period, while
stock issues accounted for only two percent (Hubbard 2000: 8).26  Banks play a
predominant role in supplying both short-term and long-term credit.  By providing
liquidity through short-term credit that can be used to finance working capital, banks
allow businesses to release their own internal funds to finance fixed long-term capital.
Banks and firms may also enter into explicit agreements whereby short-term loans are
periodically renewed, which ultimately converts these loans into long-term finance.  Such
financing arrangements were prevalent during the English industrial revolution (Cameron
et al 1967).
                                                                                                                                                
motivates the emphasis on central bank independence as a means to achieving price stability.
26 See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Mayer (1990) for further evidence on the composition of
outside finance for nonfinancial firms.
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At their current level of development and given their immense needs for financing
physical capital accumulation in infrastructure, African countries will benefit from
fostering the development of a sound banking system.  Some scholars have suggested that
African countries should explicitly emphasize banking sector development over stock
market development.  For example, Ajit Singh (1999: 343) unequivocally concludes that
for many African countries, pursuing stock market development is “a costly irrelevance
which they can ill afford” (also see Singh and Weiss 1998).  It is certainly difficult to
reach a consensus on the right model of financial system that is most appropriate for
African countries.  The emphasis should be on promoting the right macroeconomic and
institutional environment that facilitates financial intermediation in general.  In such an
environment, both banks and stock markets are likely to prosper.
D. Financial intermediation and the capital flight problem
According to recent studies, Africa as a region has the highest amount of private
assets held abroad compared to other developing regions (Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo
1999).  Capital flight is pervasive especially in the severely indebted low-income
countries, which at the same time are overburdened by high levels of indebtedness
(Boyce and Ndikumana 2000).  The illicit outflows of capital impose high costs on
African economies and must be regarded by policy makers as an urgent matter of
concern.
Some studies have investigated the causes or determinants of capital flight from
Africa using both cross-country data and country-specific case studies.  These studies
find that capital flight is higher in countries (or episodes) with high corruption, bad
governance, and high political instability.  Olopoenia (2000) finds that capital flight in
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Uganda was higher during the periods of political and economic instability in the 1970s
and the first half of the 1980s.  Excessive monetary expansion, high inflation, and high
fiscal deficits also tend to be correlated with high capital flight.  The cross-country study
by Hermes and Lensink (1992), the study by Nyoni (2000) on Tanzania, and the study by
Olopoenia (2000) on Uganda provide some evidence that supports this prediction.
Another important factor of capital flight is market distortions, especially in the
form of overvalued exchange rates and repressed interest rates.  Nyoni (2000) finds that
the black market premium, which is an indicator of market distortions, influences the
level of capital flight.  Based on data from Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zaïre, the study by Lensink, Hermes, and Murinde (1998) shows that
financial liberalization is associated with a decline in capital flight, indicating that
reducing market distortions can contribute to reducing capital flight.  High country-
specific risk leads to high capital flight, as a result of portfolio management by market
participants.  Using a portfolio choice approach, Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo (1999)
conclude that high capital flight from Africa was due, among other things, to overvalued
exchange rates, high country-specific risk, and high indebtedness.
High capital flight is an impediment to financial market development in various
ways.  Past and current capital flight constitutes a drain on national resources and
depresses private saving and investment.  Capital flight contributes to increasing
macroeconomic uncertainty, which discourages saving and lending.  This is because
market participants interpret high capital flight as a signal of loss of control over
economic policy by the national authorities.  Through herd effects, capital flight can lead
to more capital flight as agents seek to minimize expected portfolio losses in the event
30
that economic (and political) conditions deteriorate further.  This discourages saving in
the domestic financial system, which consequently retards financial development.
V. Conclusion
Empirical research on the links between financial development and economic
growth in Africa is still limited.  However the existing evidence suggests that financial
market development is positively related to the growth rate of real income.  Research in
this area is constrained by the lack of detailed information that can allow us to assess the
extent to which financial systems fulfill their roles of facilitating exchange, identifying
productive investment projects, mobilizing saving, managing risk, and monitoring
management.  Such information is necessary not only for research but also for
formulating appropriate strategies for financial development and economic growth.
The evidence discussed in this chapter indicates that financial systems are still
relatively underdeveloped in the majority of African countries.  Aggregate (traditional)
measures of financial intermediation show that credit supply has either stagnated or
declined in most of sub-Saharan African countries in the past two decades.  However,
recent structural and institutional indicators of financial market development paint a
relatively more optimistic picture.  These indicators show that a number of countries have
made significant progress in promoting an environment that is conducive to financial
intermediation.  This is typically the case for countries that have consistently pursued
macroeconomic reforms, especially through fiscal discipline, which has promoted a
stable business environment.  Much progress is still needed, however, especially to
strengthen the institutional framework for banking regulation, promote monetary policy
autonomy, establish government and central bank credibility, develop banking
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supervision capacity (through investment in technology and human capital), which will
create an environment that is conducive to investment and saving.  Progress in those
areas will not only promote financial market development but will also foster economic
growth.
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Table 1: Some indicators of economic performance for African countries, 1970-1998
Period Africa
(37 countries)
Sub-Saharan Africa
(33 countries)
SSA without South Africa
(32 countries)
Real GNP
per capita
in 1998
(1995
US$)a
Gross
domestic
investment
(% GDP)
Gross
domestic
saving
(% GDP)
Real GNP
per capita
(1995 US $)
Gross
domestic
investment
(% GDP)
Gross
domestic
saving
(% GDP)
Real GNP
per capita
(1995 US $)
Gross
domestic
investment
(% GDP)
Gross
domestic
saving
(% GDP)
1970-79 793 23.6 21.3 769 21.1 20.9 379 21.4 18.7
1980-89 805 21.8 20.6 711 18.3 19.8 347 17.6 15.1
1990-98 769 18.8 17.7 638 16.2 16.9 327 17.9 16.3
Average
annual %
change:
70s to 80s 0.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.8 -1.4 -0.5 -0.8 -1.9 -2.1
80s to 90s -0.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.1 -1.2 -1.6 -0.6 0.2 0.8
Source: Author’s computations from World Development Indicators 2000.
The sample includes the countries in Tables A1 and A2, excluding Mozambique (has short time series).  Lesotho has systematically
negative (and large) saving rates; it is excluded in the computation of the sample average saving rate.
a The weighted average real GNP per capita in 1998 is $771 for the sample of 37 countries but only $503 when we exclude countries
with GNP per capita over $2000 (Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, and Tunisia).
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Table 2: Financial development indicators for African countries, 1970-1998 (% of GDP)
Period Africa
(37 countries)
Sub-Saharan Africa
(33 countries)
SSA without South Africa
(32 countries)
Liquid
liabilities
Private
credit
Bank
credit
Liquid
liabilities
Private
credit
Bank
credit
Liquid
liabilities
Private
credit
Bank
credit
1970-79 43.7 39.0 57.6 42.6 42.9 59.1 19.5 14.3 20.5
1980-89 49.7 44.9 69.8 40.9 46.6 64.3 24.2 18.3 32.1
1990-98 47.3 52.8 76.5 38.1 64.5 80.7 22.5 14.6 26.4
Average annual
% change:
70s to 80s 1.3 1.4 1.9 -0.4 0.8 0.8 2.2 2.5 4.6
80s to 90s -0.5 1.6 0.9 -0.7 3.3 2.3 -0.7 -2.2 -1.9
Source: Author’s computations from World Development Indicators 2000.
The sample includes the countries in Tables A1 and A2, excluding Mozambique (has short time series).  For Lesotho and Botswana,
credit by bank series are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (December 1999 CDROM edition).  The series in World
Development Indicators have negative bank credit to GDP ratios.
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Table 3: The 150 largest banks in Africa: deposits, credit, and revenue, 1996
Country Among the 150 largest banks Among the 50  largest banks
Total assets Share in total
deposits
Share in total credit
supply
Loans/Deposits
(%)
Revenue/product(%)
Million
FF
% of total # of
banksa
% of total # of
banks
% of
total
# of
banks
South Africa 28822 33.9 10 39.8 6 43.9 7 91.53 24.4
Egypt 22363 26.3 21 34.6 14 27.4 15 77.49 45.4
Morocco 12350 14.5 8 12.5 7 11.7 7 116.31 31.4
Tunisia 5291 6.2 7 3.9 6 4.3 6 92.65 23.4
Algeria 3679 4.3 3 1.9 1 7.0 2 152.95 3.8
Nigeria 2014 2.4 16 1.5 3 0.9 3 49.97 55.9
Mauritius 1355 1.6 3 0.6 1 0.4 1 51.09 49.6
Gabon 919 1.1 3 - - 0.2 1 - 28.8
Ethiopia 863 1.0 2 1.4 1 1.4 1 83.89 66.2
Cameroon 825 0.9 3 0.4 2 - - - -
Côte d’Ivoire 727 0.8 4 0.9 2 1.0 2 37.31 36.3
Namibia 715 0.8 3 0.7 2 0.8 2 94.77 31.1
Kenya 704 0.8 6 0.3 1 0.3 1 76.47 78.3
Senegal 396 0.5 5 0.2 1 - - - -
Sudan 387 0.4 2 1.0 2 0.6 2 56.04 127.6
Botswana 354 0.4 2 0.2 1 - - - 35.5
Malawi 287 0.3 3 - - - - - 58.6
Madagascar 203 0.2 2 - - - - - 36.5
Mozambique 108 0.1 1 - - - - - 50.5
Source: Jeune Afrique Economie, “Le Classement des banques Africaines”, Hors-Série, Novembre 1998
a The total does not add up to 150.  Only countries that are represented in 50 largest banks are included in this table.
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Table 4: Stock markets in sub-Saharan Africa: some indicators, 1990-1998a
Market capitalizationCountry Year
established
Listed
companies
1998 Volume As % of GDP
Capital return (%) Trading 1998
(1997 for Swaziland
and Zambia)
Million
US $
1998
Annual
% growth
1990-98
% of
GDP
1998
Annual
% growth
1990-98
1997 1998 Value (%
GDP)
Turnover
ratio (%)
Botswana 1989 14 724 15.7 14.8 12.1 92.2 14.3 1.4 1.1
Côte
d'Ivoireb
1976 35 1818 16.1 16.5 15.8 3.6 22.9 0.3 4.5
Egypt 1888 861 24381 38.8 29.5 28.0 15.8 -26.6 6.1 22.3
Ghana 1989 21 1384 51.4 18.5 48.6 9.5 63.1 0.8 6.5
Kenya 1954 58 2024 20.6 17.5 16.1 -12.2 -3.5 0.7 0.3
Mauritius 1988 40 1849 27.3 44.0 20.2 -0.2 5.8 2.4 2.9
Morocco 1929 53 15676 41.7 44.1 36.1 35.3 26.4 3.9 10.1
Namibia 1992 15 429 65.3 13.8 63.9 4.7 -46.6 0.4 2.3
Nigeria 1960 186 2887 9.7 7.0 4.8 -8.6 -20.8 0.4 5.2
South
Africa
1887 668 170252 2.7 127.6 0.5 -10.4 -27.6 43.8 30.4
Swaziland 1990 5 85 22.3 7.0 17.0 na na 28.8 126
Tunisia 1969 38 2268 19.8 11.4 12.8 -29.7 5.9 0.9 0.9
Zambia 1994 8 293 148.9 8.7 151.8 103.3 -58 0.2 2.0
Zimbabwe 1896 67 1310 -7.3 20.7 -3.4 -53.1 -54.8 2.6 9.2
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000; Global Financial Data (www.globalfindata.com); MBendi Information for Africa (1998), “African
Capital Market 1998” (www.mbendi.co.za).
a The data for 1990 are not available for some countries.  The relevant years are: 1991 for Botswana and Ghana, 1992 for Namibia, and 1995 for Zambia.
Countries with recently established stock markets are not included in this table.  These are Malawi (established in 1997), Tanzania (established in 1996), and
Uganda (established in 1997).
b The Abidjan Stock Exchange was officially closed in December 1997, ahead of the opening of the regional stock exchange (Bourse Régionale des Valeurs
Mobilières, BRVM).
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Table 5: Some economic performance indicators for African countries with stock markets, 1990-1998a
Country Real per capita GDP Gross domestic saving Gross domestic investment FDI as % of gross fixed
capital formation
Value for
1998
(in 1995
US $)
Annual %
growth 1990-
1998b
% of
GDP
1998
Annual %
growth 1990-
1998
% of
GDP
1998
Annual %
growth 1990-
1998
1992 1998
Botswana 3611 1.7 21.8 -3.5 20.6 -4.6 -0.1 7.5
Côte
d’Ivoirec
823 0.6 24.5 12.5 18.2 13.6 -29.1 15.7
Egypt 1146 2.2 15.8 -1.5 22.2 -2.8 5.3 6.1
Ghana 399 1.5 13.2 15.8 22.9 6.7 2.5 3.4
Kenya 334 -0.6 6.7 -10.1 14.4 -2.1 0.5 2.2
Mauritius 4034 3.8 24.0 -0.4 24.1 -2.6 1.7 1.3
Morocco 1388 0.4 14.7 -1.5 22.6 -1.9 6.6 4.1
Namibia 2133 0.8 18.8 3.5 19.0 -1.4 20.2 12.9
Nigeria 256 -0.3 11.8 -6.5 20.0 -2.5 26.3 12.7
South
Africa
3918 -0.2 16.9 0.2 15.6 4.7 -0.2 2.5
Swaziland 1409 -0.2 19.2 0.1 12.3 0.3 33.8 35.8
Tunisia 2283 2.7 24.3 -1.5 27.5 -3.3 12.5 13.6
Zambia 388 -1.7 5.3 11.1 14.3 0.8 12.9 44.3
Zimbabwe 703 0.0 15.4 -1.2 17.2 -0.8 1.3 39.8
Source: Author’s computations from World Development Indicators 2000.  FDI data are from UNCTAD’s World Investment Report
(1998, 2000).
a The data for 1990 are not available for some countries.  The relevant years are: 1991 for Botswana and Ghana, 1992 for Namibia,
and 1995 for Zambia.
b  The annual average changes are obtained with an OLS regression of the logarithm of the relevant variable on time (a time trend).
c The Abidjan Stock Exchange was officially closed in  December 1997, ahead of the opening of the regional stock exchange (Bourse
Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, BRVM).
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Table 6: FDI inflows in selected African countries, 1986-1998 (million, constant 1995 $)
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Countries with active stock markets
Botswana 87 138 47 47 41 -9 -2 -301 -15 70 69 98 90 111
Côte d’Ivoire 88 107 61 21 23 17 -246 92 122 268 295 440 315 277
Egypt 1516 1150 1388 1389 788 271 489 517 1301 596 623 868 1080 1491
Ghana 5 6 6 17 16 21 24 131 241 107 117 81 56 114
Kenya 41 52 0 69 61 20 6 2 4 32 13 39 42 42
Mauritius 9 21 28 40 44 20 16 16 21 19 36 54 12 49
Morocco 1 73 99 186 244 339 450 516 571 335 349 1055 330 842
Namibia NA NA -2 -1 31 129 126 58 102 153 126 82 77 113
Nigeria 208 732 440 2092 631 762 955 1411 2030 1079 1558 1505 1054 1392
South Africa -66 -91 514 1517 1883 227 -45 -20 394 1241 800 3732 563 1368
Swaziland 39 58 63 83 42 85 88 73 26 33 -61 -47 51 -4
Tunisia 78 112 71 88 80 134 560 485 586 378 343 358 672 366
Zambia 35 91 108 182 218 36 48 55 41 97 114 202 199 162
Zimbabwe 10 -38 -21 -11 -13 3 21 40 42 118 79 132 445 59
Countries without Stock markets
Angola 78 112 153 222 -360 712 307 317 176 472 177 403 1117 1803
Cameroon 24 15 78 0 -67 -16 31 5 -9 7 34 44 50 40
Congo 27 52 10 3 8 5 4 156 5 3 8 9 4 5
Gabon 137 109 155 -34 79 -59 135 -120 -104 -113 305 140 212 199
Lesotho 2 7 24 14 18 9 3 16 283 275 280 263 263 135
Mozambique 0 0 6 3 10 25 27 34 36 45 71 63 214 382
Tanzania* -10 -1 5 7 -3 3 13 21 52 150 146 155 172 182
Uganda* 0 0 -5 -7 -16 1 3 58 91 125 117 171 211 179
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Reports (various issues 1992 to 2000).  Nominal values are deflated to real values using the US PPI index
(base 1995=100) from the International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues).
* Stock markets recently established (1996 in Tanzania, 1997 in Uganda).
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Table 7: Indicators of banking regulation and supervision in selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1997
Country/group Supervisory framework Prudential
regulation
Safety net Legal infrastructure
Banking law (year) Central bank
autonomy
Capital ratio (%) Deposit insurance
available
Adequate legal
protection of bank
performance
Angola Draft completed Limited Negative to >20 n.a. No
BCEAOa 1990 Average n.a. Under consideration No
BEACb 1992 Average n.a. No, agreement
reached for a scheme
No
Botswana 1995 Full 19.8 No, under discussion No, plans under way
Ethiopia 1994 Limited 4.5 No No
Ghana 1989 Average 14.7 No No
Kenya 1991 Partial 18 Yes No
Lesotho 1973 Low 5 No Yes
Madagascar 1996 Full n.a. No No
Malawi 1989 Average 36.2 No No
Mauritius 1966; 1988; 1995c Full 9-10 No Yes
Mozambique 1992 Average 13 No n.a.
Namibia 1965 Full >8 No Yes
Rwanda About to be adopted Full 5 No No
South Africa Banks Act 1990;
Mutual Banks Act 1993
Full 9.8 No, proposed Yes
Swaziland 1975 Full 8 No No
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Table 7 (concluded): Indicators of banking regulation and supervision in selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1997
Country/group Supervisory framework Prudential
regulation
Safety net Legal infrastructure
Banking law (year) Central bank
autonomy
Capital ratio (%) Deposit insurance
available
Adequate legal
protection of bank
performance
Tanzania 1991 Low 1.55 Yes No
Uganda 1964; 1993; 1993d Full 6.15 Yes Yese
Zambia 1994 Average 15 No, proposed No
Zimbabwe 1965 Low 10.1 No No
Source: Mehran, Hassanali et al (1998) “Financial sector development in sub-Saharan African countries,” IMF Occasional Paper 169.
a BCEAO = Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo (and Guinea-Bissau as of 1997).
b BEAC = Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.
c Mauritius: Bank of Mauritius Act in 1966, Banking Act in 1988, and Foreign Exchange Dealers Act in 1995.
d Uganda: Bills of Exchange Act in 1964; Bank of Uganda Statute in 1993; Financial Institutions Statute in 1993.
e Uganda: No special legal facilities ensuring contracts performance.
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Table A1: GNP, investment, and saving for African countries (averages by decade), 1970-1998
Country Real GNP per capita
(at 1995 US $)
Gross domestic investment
(% of GDP)
Gross domestic saving
(% of GDP)
1970-79 1980-89 1990-98 1970-79 1980-89 1990-98 1970-79 1980-89 1990-98
Algeria 1429 1699 1458 41.6 33.9 28.8 35.1 35.4 30.1
Benin 349 365 359 15.5 15.1 16.2 2.7 1.1 7.4
Botswana 929 2109 3330 39.7 28.8 26.7 28.5 41.5 35.8
Burkina Faso 201 223 239 21.3 19.7 22.5 3.0 -1.0 7.4
Burundi 165 191 175 8.2 16.6 12.1 3.3 3.1 -3.1
Cameroon 529 853 616 21.4 23.8 16.1 18.3 24.1 19.0
Central African Republic 455 395 329 15.0 10.9 11.0 4.2 -1.1 2.7
Chad 246 207 223 14.9 6.5 11.3 6.2 -9.1 -2.5
Congo, DRC 375 285 152 16.3 11.7 7.0 12.8 10.9 8.5
Congo, Rep. 611 919 719 29.7 32.5 33.3 12.0 31.9 26.8
Côte d’Ivoire 1009 832 684 24.1 16.5 11.4 27.4 19.6 16.8
Egypt 507 769 1016 23.1 28.6 19.4 11.6 15.5 13.5
Gabon 5257 4453 3908 46.4 34.6 24.3 54.3 44.3 41.8
Gambia 339 364 347 12.0 19.7 20.3 2.3 6.5 6.1
Ghana 443 345 376 10.2 7.8 19.8 10.2 4.8 8.9
Kenya 285 323 323 23.2 20.3 16.6 19.8 15.9 14.0
Lesotho 469 623 653 21.9 46.0 76.8 -57.8 -72.9 -27.1
Madagascar 359 273 235 9.8 10.6 11.8 4.2 3.3 3.9
Malawi 166 163 166 27.2 18.6 17.7 14.4 11.8 4.8
Mali 270 260 251 15.5 17.2 22.7 2.2 -0.4 7.4
Mauritania 466 442 429 17.2 24.2 18.5 5.0 2.8 7.4
Mauritius 1615 2146 3438 23.9 23.7 28.3 20.1 20.4 24.2
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Table A1 (continued): GNP, investment, and saving for African countries (averages by decade), 1970-1998
Country Real GNP per capita
(at 1995 US $)
Gross domestic investment
(% of GDP)
Gross domestic saving
(% of GDP)
1970-79 1980-89 1990-98 1970-79 1980-89 1990-98 1970-79 1980-89 1990-98
Morocco 954 1128 1276 22.6 24.4 22.1 15.2 13.5 13.4
Mozambique NA 133 143 NA 8.1 17.9 NA -10.3 -8.6
Niger 333 265 209 15.6 15.3 8.6 6.7 7.3 2.6
Nigeria 271 214 229 22.9 16.5 18.6 22.7 17.5 23.2
Rwanda 253 307 227 11.7 15.3 14.5 6.0 5.0 -5.7
Senegal 587 546 537 14.6 12.1 16.1 7.8 0.1 9.8
Seychelles 3671 4691 6638 38.8 26.4 30.9 32.0 24.1 22.5
Sierra Leone 303 286 194 NA 5.9 8.4 NA 3.4 8.3
South Africa 4139 4200 3821 20.8 18.9 14.6 22.4 23.6 17.4
Sudan 240 218 221 15.1 14.4 NA 9.6 5.0 NA
Swaziland 875 1163 1519 27.4 26.5 26.2 30.7 12.9 21.8
Togo 395 375 323 28.1 19.5 16.0 27.7 12.3 8.6
Tunisia 1276 1630 1925 26.2 28.8 28.5 23.6 22.7 24.0
Uganda . 230 284 9.7 8.5 15.2 10.0 2.3 3.6
Zambia 587 445 381 30.2 16.1 14.1 33.2 14.0 8.3
Zimbabwe 666 648 649 18.9 17.3 19.7 19.2 16.5 16.6
Source: World Development Indicators 2000.
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Table A2: Financial development indicators for African countries (averages by decade), 1980-1998
Country Overall developmenta Liquid liabilities
(% GDP)
Credit to private sector
(% GDP)
Credit by banks
 (% GDP)
1987 1997 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98
Algeria 71.9 47.5 54.1 13.6 82.0 54.0
Benin Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 22.3 26.5 27.7 11.0 27.4 12.0
Botswana Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 24.7 23.2 9.7 11.9 12.2 13.0
Burkina Faso Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 16.8 22.6 15.5 11.3 13.4 10.2
Burundi 17.4 19.6 10.5 16.8 24.4 23.4
Cameroon Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 21.7 17.6 27.1 13.5 25.4 23.7
Central African Republic Min. dev. Min. dev. 17.9 18.6 10.3 4.8 17.8 12.5
Chad 15.7 12.6 13.2 4.8 17.0 11.8
Congo, DRC Min. dev. Min. dev. 14.9 15.0 2.2 1.1 9.2 13.2
Congo, Rep. Undev. Somewhat dev. 17.4 17.4 20.0 10.8 25.3 22.1
Côte d’Ivoire Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 28.6 27.9 38.1 25.8 44.9 36.3
Egypt 85.6 82.6 31.7 35.9 108.4 88.7
Gabon Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 19.9 16.1 19.2 9.9 23.5 19.2
Gambia Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 24.5 24.9 19.3 10.5 41.8 6.8
Ghana Min. dev. Largely dev. 14.8 17.1 2.8 5.8 21.0 22.7
Kenya Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 29.0 39.3 30.1 33.1 47.4 52.9
Lesotho Undev. Min. dev. 49.8 37.8 13.2 19.0 28.8 23.9
Madagascar Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 17.0 20.3 18.5 13.7 39.6 23.0
Malawi Undev. Min. dev. 21.9 19.4 13.1 8.3 33.6 16.2
Mali Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 20.1 22.3 17.1 12.5 27.5 12.4
Mauritania 21.9 21.3 27.9 31.4 34.7 31.8
Mauritius Somewhat dev. Largely dev. 49.2 72.9 25.9 43.9 55.3 61.6
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Table A2 (continued): Financial development indicators for African countries (averages by decade), 1980-1998
Country Overall developmenta Liquid liabilities
(% GDP)
Credit to private sector
(% GDP)
Credit by banks
 (% GDP)
1987 1997 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98
Morocco 44.6 63.1 19.0 32.0 47.9 58.1
Mozambique Undev. Somewhat dev. 41.7 26.0 37.2 13.9 51.9 6.7
Niger Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 16.3 14.9 16.4 7.8 18.5 11.9
Nigeria Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 29.4 18.3 15.4 8.6 37.7 21.2
Rwanda 14.3 15.9 7.2 7.3 9.4 15.5
Senegal Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 27.1 23.0 36.1 21.1 46.9 27.8
Seychelles 31.3 52.5 12.7 14.9 35.6 73.2
Sierra Leone 18.5 12.2 4.4 3.0 30.9 42.9
South Africa Largely dev. Largely dev. 54.2 51.9 68.8 108.2 89.8 128.1
Sudan 28.3 16.1 10.8 3.6 32.0 13.8
Swaziland Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 31.6 30.0 20.6 21.7 16.1 4.7
Togo Min. dev. Min. dev. 39.5 29.5 24.3 21.7 26.2 23.8
Tunisia 45.9 47.7 49.4 52.8 56.7 57.1
Uganda Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 12.1 10.3 3.3 4.3 23.2 8.5
Zambia Min. dev. Largely dev. 31.7 17.8 14.8 7.5 63.2 58.8
Zimbabwe Min. dev. Somewhat dev. 24.6 23.5 20.0 31.0 42.7 49.4
Source: World Development Indicators 2000.  Gelbard and Leite (1999) “Measuring financial development in sub-Saharan Africa,”
IMF, working paper 99/105.
a This is Gelbard and Leite’s (1999) assessment of overall development (sample includes only sub-Saharan African countries).  The
categories correspond to the four quartiles based on a composite index including six aspects of financial development: market
structure, range of financial products, financial liberalization, institutional environment, openness, and monetary policy instruments.
The categories are: undeveloped (undev.), minimally developed (min. dev.), somewhat developed (somewhat dev.), and largely
developed (largely dev.).
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Figure 1: Financial development in Africa, 1970-1998
Averages for 37 African countries
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Source: World Development Indicators 2000 ; Gelbard and Leite (1999) "Measuring financial development in sub-Saharan Africa," IMF, working paper 99/105.
Average aggregate ratios are for a sample of 37 countries, including 4 North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia).
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
“Liquidity” = liquid liabilities of financial institutions (M3 % of GDP).
“Investment” = gross domestic investment (% of GDP).
“Private credit” = credit to the private sector (% of GD).
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Figure 2: FDI inflows in some African countries, 1986-1999 (in million constant 1995 US$)
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Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (various issues from 1992 to 2000).
Nomial values are deflated to real values using the US PPI index (base: 1995=100).
